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NOT SO FAST! SCRUTINIZING THE "GUN
JUMPING" PROVISIONS OF THE SECURITIES ACT
UNDER THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
Edward T. Highberger*
INTRODUCTION
Although less menacing than its older cousin strict scrutiny, the
commercial speech doctrine has become a formidable check on state
and federal regulators. Foraying into markets as diverse as tobacco
products and legal services, the commercial speech doctrine has
proven fatal to an increasing number of laws restricting commercial
advertising.1 Indeed, this plucky young doctrine seems poised to chal-
lenge even the august federal securities regime. Fearing the fallout
from such an encounter, courts and commentators have argued that
the First Amendment does not shield, or only negligibly protects,
speech captured by securities regulations. These proponents of a
"securities exception" to the First Amendment assemble a host of the-
oretical justifications supporting limited judicial review for speech-
restrictive securities regulations. Some argue that less rigorous First
Amendment scrutiny is appropriate for laws that only incidentally cap-
ture speech when regulating a larger course of unlawful conduct.2
Others rely on the distinct "institutional" features of the securities
regime as a principled reason for a securities exception. 3
This Note addresses some of these arguments, concluding that
both Supreme Court precedent and the constitutional values animat-
ing the commercial speech doctrine undermine the case for a securi-
ties exception. The Note reasons that the Court's antipaternalistic,
free market approach to commercial advertisements forces lower
courts to treat regulations that prohibit securities advertisements the
same as any other restriction on commercial speech. Accordingly, this
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2009; B.A., Philosophy
and History, University of Tulsa, 2005.
1 See infra Part 1.
2 See infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
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Note provides a roadmap for determining how securities regulations
would fare under the commercial speech doctrine by applying the
Central Hudson test-the Court's current standard for evaluating limits
on commercial speech 4-to some of the most speech-restrictive rules
in the federal securities regime: the "gun jumping" provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933.5
To that end, this Note first outlines the evolution of the Supreme
Court's commercial speech doctrine in Part I. Part II then describes
and responds to three theoretical arguments for a securities exception
to the commercial speech doctrine, concluding that a securities
exception is incompatible with the Court's commercial speech juris-
prudence. Although Part III.A argues that most of the federal securi-
ties regime would survive scrutiny under the Central Hudson test, Part
III.B contends that the "gun jumping" provisions of the Securities Act
are unconstitutional since they unnecessarily suppress truthful, non-
misleading speech.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE:
KEY CASES AND DEVELOPMENTS
Before 1976, the Supreme Court did not recognize any First
Amendment protections for commercial advertising. The Court's per-
functory treatment of First Amendment challenges to commercial
speech restrictions is epitomized by Valentine v. Chrestensen.6 In Valen-
tine, the Court upheld an injunction preventing a New York City busi-
nessman from distributing handbills which advertised the exhibition
of a submarine. 7 The injunction was issued pursuant to a city ordi-
nance which prohibited the dissemination of commercial leaflets on
city streets. 8 Although acknowledging that government may not
unduly restrict "the freedom of communicating information and dis-
seminating opinion" without offending the First Amendment, the
Court declared that "the Constitution imposes no such restraint on
government as respects purely commercial advertising." 9
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.,10 the Court reversed itself, concluding that, while adver-
tisements may be regulated in some circumstances, the First Amend-
4 See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
5 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2000).
6 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
7 See id. at 53-55.
8 See id. at 53.
9 Id. at 54.
10 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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ment is not blind to commercial speech."l In Virginia Pharmacy, a
group of pharmaceutical consumers challenged a Virginia statute that
prohibited pharmacists from advertising the price of prescription
drugs.' 2 The Court struck down the statute and dismissed Virginia's
claim that the commercial character of the speech at issue rendered it
unprotected by the First Amendment.13 Such an approach, the Court
warned, was "simplistic' 4 since it ignored the general societal interest
in the "free flow of commercial information."1 5 Opening more chan-
nels of communication, the Court reasoned, will make the citizenry
more informed and thus better equipped to secure their interests.16
The alternative to this marketplace model rests upon the "highly
paternalistic" assumption that people will act contrary to their own
interests even when commercial information is accurate, and, there-
fore, the public should at times be kept ignorant of lawful, nonmis-
leading information. 17 Although Virginia Pharmacy provided little in
the way of a doctrinal framework to test regulations of commercial
speech, it helped lay the theoretical foundations for the Supreme
Court's commercial speech jurisprudence. Faith in the marketplace
and fear of the specter of paternalism have been frequently invoked
by the Court when striking down government restrictions on commer-
11 See id. at 770.
12 See id. at 749-50.
13 See id. at 770-73.
14 Id. at 759.
15 Id. at 764.
16 See id. at 770. Significantly, Justice Blackmun structured his argument for the
"free flow of commercial information" in political as well as economic terms. He
stated:
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the alloca-
tion of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous pri-
vate economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those
decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end,
the free flow of commercial information is indispensable. And if it is indis-
pensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it
is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that
system ought to be regulated or altered. Therefore, even if the First Amend-
ment were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public deci-
sionmaking in a democracy, we could not say that the free flow of
information does not serve that goal.
Id. at 765 (citations omitted).
17 See id. at 770.
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cial speech. 18 These important themes and their impact on securities
regulations will be revisited later in this Note. 19
Four years after Virginia Pharmacy, the Court in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission2° articulated its current
intermediate scrutiny test for determining the constitutionality of
commercial speech restrictions. Central Hudson involved a challenge
to a regulation that banned promotional advertising by electric utili-
ties. 2' To test the constitutionality of the regulation, the Court
applied its newly minted four-part test:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is pro-
tected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come
within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not
be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the gov-
ernmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest. 22
Satisfied that the electric utility's advertisements were neither false
nor misleading and that the state's proffered governmental interest of
energy conservation was substantial, the Court focused upon how well-
tailored the regulation was to the state interest.23 Specifically, the
Court scrutinized whether the complete prohibition of all advertise-
ments for utility services was "more extensive than necessary" to secure
18 See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002) ("We have
previously rejected the notion that the Government has an interest in preventing the
dissemination of truthful commercial information in order to prevent members of
the public from making bad decisions with the information."); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) ("[B]ans against truthful, nonmisleading
commercial speech . . . usually rest solely on the offensive assumption that the public
will respond 'irrationally' to the truth. The First Amendment directs us to be espe-
cially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the govern-
ment perceives to be their own good." (citation omitted)); City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 421 n.17 (1993) ("'[Advertisements] are well
calculated to enlarge and enlighten the public mind, and are worthy of being enu-
merated among the many methods of awakening and maintaining the popular atten-
tion, with which more modem times, beyond all preceding example, abound.'"
(quoting DANIEL J. BooRSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 328
(1958))); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) ("[Commercial] speech
serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed and reliable decisionmak-
ing." (citing Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761-65)).
19 See infra Part II.
20 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
21 Id. at 558-60.
22 Id. at 566.
23 See id. at 566-70.
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the interest of energy conservation. 24 In concluding that the regula-
tion was too extensive, the Court particularly noted that the ban cap-
tured advertisements even for energy saving products and that the
State offered little evidence demonstrating that less restrictive
means-for example, requiring the utility to disclose information
regarding the relative cost and efficiency of its services within the
advertisements-would not just as effectively advance the state
interest.25
The Court's march toward recognizing ever-increasing protection
for commercial speech appeared to stall in Posadas de Puerto Rico Asso-
ciates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico2 6 In Posadas, a casino operator chal-
lenged a Puerto Rican law that prohibited advertisements of casino
gambling directed at residents of Puerto Rico. 27 Despite the fact that
advertisements for horse racing, cockfighting, and lotteries were still
permitted under Puerto Rican law, then-Justice Rehnquist, writing for
a majority of the Court, found that the statute was sufficiently well-
tailored toward the proffered state interest of reducing the corruption
and crime that accompany gambling.28 Justice Rehnquist was
unmoved by the casino operator's contention that state-sponsored
counterspeech aimed at discouraging casino gambling would be a far
less restrictive means of achieving the state interest. Deferring to the
legislature, Justice Rehnquist asserted that Puerto Rico was within its
rights to decide that such a "counterspeech policy" would be less
effective than directly prohibiting casino gambling advertisements. 29
Finally, Justice Rehnquist attempted to provide a broader justification
for the statute by arguing that Puerto Rico's unquestioned power to
ban casino gambling itself includes the "lesser" power of prohibiting
advertisements for casino gambling.30
24 See id. at 569-71.
25 See id. at 570-71.
26 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
27 See id. at 330-31.
28 See id. at 342-44.
29 See id. at 344. Justice Rehnquist buttressed his argument by surmising that
"[t]he legislature could conclude, as it apparently did here, that residents of Puerto
Rico are already aware of the risks of casino gambling, yet would nevertheless be
induced by widespread advertising to engage in such potentially harmful conduct."
Id. Justice Rehnquist thus seemingly contemplates a legislature permissibly acting
upon the very same "paternalistic" assumption rejected in Virginia Pharmacy--namely,
that people will act contrary to their own best interest even when presented with accu-
rate, nonmisleading information.
30 See id. at 345-46. Some commentators reasonably concluded that the "greater-
includes-the-lesser" rationale coupled with the strong showing of deference to legisla-
tive judgment indicated that the Posadas Court had recognized a "vice" exception to
2008] 2145
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44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island'1 signaled the return of a more
rigorous examination of commercial speech restrictions. In 44
Liquormart, the Court struck down two Rhode Island statutes prohibit-
ing the advertisement of retail pricing for alcoholic beverages. 32 Jus-
tice Stevens, who authored the plurality opinion, relied heavily on the
marketplace model articulated in Virginia Pharmacy. The Rhode
Island statutes were especially troubling, Justice Stevens argued,
because they completely foreclosed certain channels of truthful, non-
misleading commercial information. 33 Thus, they not only curtailed
consumer choice, but also "obscure[d] an 'underlying governmental
policy' that could be implemented without regulating speech" and,
therefore, "impede [d] debate over central issues of public policy. '3 4
In sharp contrast to Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Posadas, Jus-
tice Stevens showed little deference to legislative judgments in 44
Liquormart. Justice Stevens stressed that the state must provide some
"evidentiary support" demonstrating that the statutes directly advance
the proffered governmental interest of temperance. 35 Rhode Island's
"speculation or conjecture" regarding the extent of the restrictions'
impact on alcohol consumption fell short of this standard.36 Likewise,
Justice Stevens noted that the statutes at issue were too extensive,
since "[i] t [was] perfectly obvious that alternative forms of regulation
that would not involve any restriction on speech would be more likely
the commercial speech doctrine. See, e.g., Donald W. Garner & Richard J. Whitney,
Protecting Children From Joe Camel and His Friends: A New First Amendment and Federal
Preemption Analysis of Tobacco Billboard Regulation, 46 EMORY L.J. 479, 494 (1997)
(describing then-Justice Rehnquist's opinion as going "well beyond Central Hudson by
apparently carving out a 'vice' exception to the commercial speech doctrine"); see also
United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993) (categorizing gambling as
a vice activity that could be completely banned when upholding federal statutes
prohibiting the broadcast of lottery advertisements).
31 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
32 See id. at 516.
33 See id. at 501-03 (plurality opinion). Indeed, the heightened scrutiny thatJus-
tice Stevens later seemed to apply in 44 Liquormart suggests that complete bans on
truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech enacted for paternalistic purposes are
subject to a more exacting review than the more deferential Central Hudson test. See
EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES 195-96 (2d ed.
2005); see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("[W]hen the government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order to
suppress the ideas it conveys, strict scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech
in question may be characterized as 'commercial.'").
34 See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 503 (plurality opinion) (quoting Cent. Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980)).
35 See id. at 505.
36 Id. at 507 (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993)).
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to achieve the State's goal of promoting temperance. '3 7 Justice Ste-
vens suggested educational campaigns aimed at encouraging temper-
ance or direct taxation of alcoholic beverages as preferable
alternatives which would survive constitutional scrutiny. 38
In perhaps the most thought-provoking portion of the opinion,
Justice Stevens explicitly rejected the "greater-includes-the-lesser" rea-
soning employed in Posadas.39 While perhaps true as a logical syllo-
gism, Justice Stevens argued, Posadas' rationale ignores the First
Amendment's implicit assumption "that attempts to regulate speech
are more dangerous than attempts to regulate conduct."40 Justice Ste-
vens appeared to ground this basic assumption in two related argu-
ments. First, democratic societies are dependent upon the free flow
of information in order to function properly and thus restrictions on
speech impact the social order in a way that conduct restrictions do
not.4 1 Second, because speech restrictions can inhibit the dissemina-
tion of useful or profitable information, such restrictions can be more
"intrusive" than prohibitions on the underlying conduct.42 As an
example,Justice Stevens contrasted a hypothetical ordinance prohibit-
ing bicycle riding against a hypothetical ordinance prohibiting
instructions on how to ride a bicycle.43 While the latter only targeted
speech, it would over time effectively serve to eliminate the activity of
bicycle riding as well, since the requisite knowledge for bicycle riding
would eventually be lost.44 Accordingly, speech regulations may well
be more injurious than prohibiting the conduct itself. "As a result,"
Justice Stevens concluded, "the First Amendment directs that govern-
ment may not suppress speech as easily as it may suppress conduct,
37 Id.
38 See id.
39 See id. at 510-14. Within the same section of his opinion, Justice Stevens also
dispelled any doubt regarding the existence of a "vice" exception to the commercial
speech doctrine: "[A] 'vice' label that is unaccompanied by a corresponding prohibi-
tion against the commercial behavior at issue fails to provide a principled justification
for the regulation of commercial speech about that activity." Id. at 514.
40 Id. at 512.
41 See id.
42 See id. at 511; see also Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regu-
lation of Capital Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 5 (1989) (describing a "hearer-centered"
approach to the First Amendment and arguing that the SEC regulatory scheme is
vulnerable to attack under such an approach).
43 See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 511.
44 To further support this argument, Justice Stevens endearingly quoted an
ancient proverb: "'Give a man a fish, and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish,
and you feed him for a lifetime.'" Id. at 511 n.19 (quoting THE INTERNATIONAL THE-
SAURUS OF QUOTATIONS 646 (Rhoda Thomas Tripp ed., 1970)).
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and that speech restrictions cannot be treated as simply another
means that the government may use to achieve its ends." 45
The Court strengthened and clarified its reinvigorated commer-
cial speech jurisprudence in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly.4 6 In Loril-
lard, several Massachusetts regulations that restricted the sale and
promotion of tobacco products were challenged. 47  Despite the
weighty governmental interest involved-namely, preventing tobacco
use by minors4 8-and the extensive data demonstrating the relation
between tobacco advertisements and tobacco consumption, 49 the
Court ruled that the regulations were unconstitutional since they
lacked a "reasonable fit" with the governmental interest.50 For exam-
ple, the Court noted that one regulation which prohibited all outdoor
tobacco advertisements (whether written or verbal) within 1000 feet
of a school or playground in effect served as an indiscriminate, almost
total ban on tobacco advertisements. 51 Such a broad sweep indicated
that the state "did not 'carefully calculat[e] the costs and benefits asso-
ciated with the burden on speech imposed' by the regulations."52 In
addition to teasing out the "tailoring" portion of the Central Hudson
test, Lorillard illustrates that the Court will not shy away from applying
robust commercial speech analysis to speech restrictions in a heavily
regulated field.53
45 Id. at 512. In this respect, the "greater-includes-the-lesser" rationale advanced
by Justice Rehnquist in Posadas is similar to the argument made by proponents of a
securities exception: that more deference is appropriate when reviewing restrictions
that incidentally capture speech while regulating a larger course of conduct. As will
be discussed further infra, both arguments are reluctant or refuse to separate the
interests implicated by the speech from the underlying conduct and, instead, treat
speech and conduct as the same category of activity which threatens the proffered
governmental interest. See infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
46 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
47 See id. at 533-37.
48 See id. at 564.
49 See id. at 556-61.
50 See id. at 565-67.
51 See id. at 561-66.
52 Id. at 561 (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,
417 (1993)).
53 Indeed, the Court ruled that the Massachusetts regulations prohibiting ciga-
rette advertisements were preempted by the federal regime established by the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (2000)). See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 550-51.
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II. THE CASE FOR A "SECURITIES EXCEPTION": THREE ARGUMENTS
Three prominent arguments are advanced by courts and scholars
for exempting securities regulations from scrutiny under the commer-
cial speech doctrine. The first and perhaps most venerable argument
posits that minimal or no First Amendment protections ought to be
extended to speech that is merely a component part of a larger course
of unlawful conduct. The second argument for a securities exception
maintains that speech incidentally suppressed within the context of an
extensive regulatory scheme, such as the federal securities regime,
cannot seek refuge under the commercial speech doctrine. Finally,
the third argument provocatively asserts that the institutional features
of the federal securities regime should insulate speech-restrictive
securities regulations from Central Hudson scrutiny. Because these
three arguments ignore the independent constitutional values impli-
cated by speech restrictions and have already been rejected implicitly
by the Supreme Court, they must ultimately be abandoned as justifica-
tions for a securities exception.
A. Ohralik and Commercial Speech That Is "Merely" a Component Part
of a Larger Course of Conduct
Despite nearly seventy-five years of substantial federal regulations
of securities, the Supreme Court has not directly resolved whether the
First Amendment embraces speech surrounding securities transac-
tions.54 This paucity of case law, however, has not prevented some
courts and commentators from relying upon snippets of the Court's
dicta as evidence that the Court has already carved out a securities
exception to the standard commercial speech doctrine. 55 While most
of these snippets did little more than cite securities regulations as an
example where the Court will apply minimal First Amendment scru-
tiny,5 6 a few offered broader justifications for recognizing a securities
54 See Antony Page, Taking Stock of the First Amendment's Application to Securities Reg-
ulation, 58 S.C. L. REv. 789, 789-90 (2007).
55 See, e.g., SEC v. Wall St. Publ'g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Allen D. Boyer, Free Speech, Free Markets, and Foolish Consistency, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 474,
479 (1992) (book review) (citing Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781
(1988)).
56 See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758
n.5 (1985) (listing "the exchange of information about securities, [and] corporate
proxy statements" as instances of "communications that are regulated without offend-
ing the First Amendment" (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456
(1978))); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61-62 (1973) ("On the basis of
[certain unprovable] assumptions both Congress and state legislatures have, for
example, drastically restricted associational rights by adopting antitrust laws, and have
2oo8] 2149
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exception. For instance, in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,57 Justice
Powell stated in dicta:
[I] t has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or
press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the con-
duct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of
language, either spoken, written, or printed. Numerous examples
could be cited of communications that are regulated without
offending the First Amendment, such as the exchange of informa-
tion about securities, corporate proxy statements, the exchange of
price and production information among competitors, and employ-
ers' threats of retaliation for the labor activities of employees. Each
of these examples illustrates that the State does not lose its power to
regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the public when-
ever speech is a component of that activity. Neither Virginia Phar-
macy nor Bates purported to cast doubt on the permissibility of these
kinds of commercial regulation. 58
In short, Justice Powell argued that when speech is a "component"
part of certain unlawful "course [s] of conduct," then the First Amend-
ment will not frustrate the government's legitimate objective by
shielding the constituent speech from regulation. 59 Applied to securi-
ties regulations, Justice Powell's rationale moves as follows. Securities
regulations target the fraudulent or otherwise harmful offering and
selling of securities. However, speech is necessary to "carr[y] out"
securities transactions. Therefore, government may regulate speech
associated with securities transactions "without offending the First
Amendment."60
Despite the intuitive appeal of Justice Powell's argument, it can-
not be relied upon as a justification for a securities exception for at
least two reasons. First, Ohralik was decided two years before Central
Hudson and thus does not reflect the more robust commercial speech
doctrine later developed by the Court. Second, and more impor-
tantly, Justice Powell's argument rests upon assumptions that were
strictly regulated public expression by issuers of and dealers in securities, profit shar-
ing 'coupons,' and 'trading stamps,' commanding what they must and must not pub-
lish and announce." (citations omitted)). But see Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 235
(1985) (White, J., concurring) (arguing that a securities regulation governing stock
market publications violated the First Amendment as applied).
57 436 U.S. 447.
58 Id. at 456 (citations omitted).
59 See id.; see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912 (1982)
("Governmental regulation that has an incidental effect on First Amendment free-
doms may be justified in certain narrowly defined instances." (emphasis added) (cit-
ing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968))).
60 See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456.
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implicitly rejected in 44 Liquormart and Lorillard. In treating certain
categories of speech as merely an incidental part of a larger "course of
conduct,"61 Justice Powell's argument does not give adequate consid-
eration to the distinct constitutional interests implicated by the "com-
ponent" speech. Rather, Powell's approach would seem to suggest
that any goods derived from speech captured by securities regulations
are wholly subsumed by, or dependent on, the underlying transaction.
Under this approach, if regulating securities transactions is justified,
then ipso facto we should be less concerned with incidentally cap-
tured speech, since the societal costs of such a regulation have already
been weighed.
In fact, Justice Powell's reasoning is similar to Justice Rehnquist's
"greater-includes-the-lesser" rationale in Posadas that was rejected in
44 Liquormart.62 ForJustice Rehnquist, the suppression of casino gam-
bling advertisements was justifiable because such ads were merely part
of the broader activity of operating casinos-a "course of conduct" the
state could undoubtedly regulate. 63  However, as 44 Liqourmart
pointed out, commercial speech implicates independent constitu-
tional and societal interests and thus cannot be lumped together with
the underlying commercial transaction for purposes of First Amend-
ment scrutiny. 64 Indeed, 44 Liquormart characterized regulations that
targeted the sale of goods as different "in kind from a State's regula-
tion of accurate information about those goods." 65 While both regula-
tions may be aimed at the same course of conduct-for instance,
fraudulent acts-only the speech restriction uniquely impacts the free
flow of information. It is in this sense "that attempts to regulate
speech are more dangerous than attempts to regulate conduct"66 and
thus "must be a last-not first-resort. '67
Accordingly, it is difficult to imagine the Court affording less
scrutiny to securities regulations that cover accurate, nonmisleading
speech simply because the speech is a component part of a wider
"course of conduct."68 Nonmisleading advertisements for securities,
61 See id.
62 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
63 Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986).
64 See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
65 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 512 (1996) (emphasis
added).
66 Id.
67 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002).
68 This is not to say that the Court will strike down securities regulations. Rather,
the above analysis demonstrates that the Court cannot carve out a securities exception
based upon the dictum in Ohralik while remaining faithful to the more robust com-
mercial speech doctrine championed in 44 Liquormart and Lorillard.
2008] 2151
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in the aggregate, are a valuable source of information that helps guar-
antee more informed investors and, consequently, more efficient capi-
tal markets. 69 These are precisely the same types of interests the
Court appealed to in Virginia Pharmacy when it initially recognized
First Amendment protections for commercial speech.70
B. Wall Street Publishing and Speech Restrictions That Occur Within
Extensive Regulatory Schemes
In an argument related to the reasoning advanced by Justice Pow-
ell in Ohralik, some courts have justified a securities regulation excep-
tion on the basis of the extensiveness of the federal securities regime.
For example, the First Circuit, in Bangor & Aroostook Railroad Co. v.
Interstate Commerce Commission,7 rejected the railroad company's con-
tention that a section of the Interstate Commerce Act violated its free
speech rights, reasoning that "the first amendment has not yet been
held to limit regulation in areas of extensive economic supervision,
such as the securities, antitrust, and transportation fields. '72
More recently, the D.C. Circuit relied on a similar rationale in
SEC v. Wall Street Publishing Institute, Inc.73 In Wall Street Publishing, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sought to enjoin the pub-
lisher of a stock market magazine from violating the antitouting provi-
sions of the Securities Act of 1933.74 The magazine published
favorable reviews of various businesses, but failed to disclose that the
articles were at times written or paid for by the featured businesses
themselves. 75 Although the antitouting laws required the disclosure
of consideration received in exchange for promoting stock,76 the dis-
69 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988) ("'No investor, no specula-
tor, can safely buy and sell securities upon the exchanges without having an intelli-
gent basis for forming his judgment as to the value of the securities he buys or sells.
The idea of a free and open public market is built upon the theory that competing
judgments of buyers and sellers as to the fair price of a security brings [sic] about a
situation where the market price reflects as nearly as possible a just price. Just as
artificial manipulation tends to upset the true function of an open market, so the
hiding and secreting of important information obstructs the operation of the markets
as indices of real value.'" (alteration in the original) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-1383,
at 11 (1934))).
70 See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
71 574 F.2d 1096 (1st Cir. 1978).
72 Id. at 1107.
73 851 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
74 See id. at 366-67.
75 See id. at 367.
76 See Securities Act of 1933 § 17(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b) (2000) ("It shall be
unlawful for any person.., to publish, give publicity to, or circulate any... communi-
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trict court denied the injunction on First Amendment grounds.7 7 The
court of appeals reversed, holding that traditional speech doctrines
were inapplicable, since speech relating to securities transactions
"forms a distinct category of communications." 78 Accordingly, the
court concluded,
[W]e do not think it necessary for us to inquire, as we would if only
commercial speech were involved, whether the government's spe-
cific regulatory objective-disclosure of consideration-is constitu-
tionally permissible. In areas of extensive federal regulation-like
securities dealing-we do not believe the Constitution requires the
judiciary to weigh the relative merits of particular regulatory objec-
tives that impinge upon communications occurring within the
umbrella of an overall regulatory scheme. 79
The court in Wall Street Publishing seemed to support its "exten-
sive federal regulation" rationale in two ways. First, it posited-in an
argument reminiscent of Justice Powell's opinion in Ohralik-that
restrictions targeting heavily regulated activities should not be frus-
trated by robust First Amendment protections simply because the
targeted conduct includes component speech.8 0 Second, the court
warned that if heightened scrutiny were applied to speech relating to
securities transactions, then it would become impossible to regulate
the securities market.8 1
Like Justice Powell's argument in Ohralik, the "extensive federal
regulation" rationale is not a viable justification for a securities excep-
tion to the commercial speech doctrine. As noted above, because
speech implicates unique constitutional and societal interests, the
cation which, though not purporting to offer a security for sale, describes such secur-
ity for a consideration received or to be received, directly or indirectly, from an issuer,
underwriter, or dealer, without fully disclosing the receipt, whether past or prospec-
tive, of such consideration and the amount thereof.").
77 See Wall St. Publ'g, 851 F.2d at 368.
78 Id. at 373.
79 Id.
80 See id. at 372 ("Where the federal government extensively regulates a field of
economic activity, communication of the regulated parties often bears directly on the
particular economic objectives sought by the government and regulation of such com-
munications has been upheld." (citation omitted)).
81 See id. at 373. It is worth noting that the members of the Supreme Court
voiced a similar fear in the context of attorney advertising. Justice O'Connor warned
that disorder may well ensue within attorney discipline systems if the Court extended
full commercial speech protections to attorney advertising. See Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 678 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). While the
fact thatJustice O'Connor's fear did not come to fruition does not detract from the
legitimate concern for the integrity of the federal securities regime, it does suggest
that such apocalyptic predictions ought to be taken with a grain of salt.
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First Amendment precludes courts from affording minimal protection
to speech even when it is a component part of an otherwise legiti-
mately regulated commercial activity.8 2 The court in Wall Street Pub-
lishing failed to articulate why these concerns should apply with any
less force simply because the regulated speech "occur[s] within the
umbrella of an overall regulatory scheme."8 3
Wall Street Publishing's second argument that extending First
Amendment protection to communications associated with securities
transactions would threaten the entire securities regulation regime is
more formidable. Few scholars, even those opposed to a securities
exception, advocate the entire dismantling of the well-entrenched
securities regime now in place.84 However, as discussed below, this
Note argues that Wall Street Publishings slippery slope argument is
mostly a red herring, since few securities regulations would likely be
held unconstitutional under the Court's current commercial speech
jurisprudence. 85
Finally, the "extensive federal regulation" argument loses most of
its vigor in light of the Court's frequent application of the commercial
speech doctrine in other heavily regulated fields. Since the birth of
the commercial speech doctrine, the Court has not felt compelled to
adopt a modified standard when reviewing state and federal restric-
tions on advertisements relating to tobacco, 86 alcohol,87 and
pharmaceuticals. 88 Indeed, as recently as 2002 the Supreme Court, in
Thompson v. Western States Medical Center,89 applied an unqualified Cen-
tral Hudson test to strike provisions of a federal statute restricting
advertisements for certain pharmaceuticals 9 -a field of extensive fed-
82 See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
83 Wall St. Publg, 851 F.2d at 373. To be fair, Wall Street Publishing was decided
eight years prior to the Supreme Court's reinvigoration of the commercial speech
doctrine in 44 Liquormart.
84 See, e.g., Lloyd L. Drury, III, Disclosure Is Speech: Imposing Meaningful First Amend-
ment Constraints on SEC Regulatory Authority, 58 S.C. L. REv. 757, 788 (2007) (conclud-
ing that even if the Court applied the commercial speech doctrine to securities
regulations, "the bulk of the regulations will remain in place, providing ample protec-
tion for investors").
85 See infra Part III.A.
86 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
87 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Rubin v.
Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
88 See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
89 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
90 See id. at 366-77.
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eral regulation.9 1 Interestingly, one of the proffered governmental
interests supporting the restrictions in Thompson is strikingly similar to
the "extensive federal regulation" argument found in Wall Street Pub-
lishing. The government asserted that the regulation was necessary "to
preserv[e] the effectiveness and integrity of the [Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act's] new drug approval process. '9 2 While the Court did not
doubt the substantial nature of that interest,93 it apparently did not
consider it an adequate reason to depart from the Central Hudson test.
Rather, the Court launched into typical Central Hudson analysis, con-
cluding that the provisions were too extensive and impermissibly
grounded in paternalistic assumptions. 94
Given the Supreme Court's previous treatment of restrictions on
commercial speech within heavily regulated fields, it seems unlikely
that it would suddenly carve out an exception for securities regula-
tions based solely on the extensiveness of the federal government's
regulation of securities transactions. Accordingly, the "extensive fed-
eral regulation" rationale articulated in Bangor and Wall Street Publish-
ing, without more, is insufficient to justify a securities exception to the
commercial speech doctrine.
C. The Federal Securities Regime as an "Institution"
Perhaps the most persuasive argument for a securities exception
can be found in Michael Siebecker's Corporate Speech, Securities Regula-
tion, and an Institutional Approach to the First Amendment.9 5 Siebecker
argues that, given the increasing protection of commercial and corpo-
rate political speech, the federal securities regime is in need of a prin-
cipled reason for the First Amendment's apparent blindness to
speech-restrictive securities regulations. 96 Building upon Frederick
91 See Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of Prescription
Drugs and Medical Devices: Perspectives on Private Certification and Tort Reform, 48 RUTGERS
L. REV. 883, 886 (1996) ("The regulatory reach of the FDA is pervasive-it controls
nearly every aspect of the development and marketing of a prescription drug or medi-
cal device .... ").
92 Thompson, 535 U.S. at 368 (emphasis added).
93 See id. at 369.
94 See id. at 371-77.
95 Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an Institutional
Approach to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 613 (2006).
96 See id. at 616, 619. Although Siebecker's analysis concerns both commercial
and corporate political speech (as well as the blurry distinction between the two), this
Note only considers his argument as it affects the application of the commercial
speech doctrine on securities regulations.
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Schauer's institutional approach theory,97 Siebecker posits that the
"institutional importance" of the securities regulation regime provides
a descriptive and normative account for disparate First Amendment
scrutiny of securities regulations. 98
Following Schauer's lead, Siebecker criticizes the Court's "institu-
tional agnosticism" and "mistaken perception that free speech is
purely an individual right."99 Rather than reviewing speech restric-
tions based solely on the categories of speech implicated, Siebecker
argues that the Court ought to consider the "institutional settings"
wherein the restrictions are imposed. 100 This "added layer of analysis"
would allow courts to supplement their often ethereal doctrinal
abstractions by "consider[ing] the importance of certain institutions
in American life and . ..assess[ing] the effects of enhancing or
restricting speech rights through the lens of those institutions." 101
Within the setting of the securities regulation regime, the institu-
tional approach counsels against more rigorous speech protections.
Whereas certain institutions, like universities, exist to facilitate the
free exchange of ideas, "the institution of securities regulation is pre-
mised upon controlled dissemination of truthful information."10 2 As
Siebecker explains:
Thus, not only does the securities regulation regime represent
one of the most important institutions in the United States, but its
institutional role remains primarily tied to ensuring the integrity of
the capital markets. Accordingly, to the extent speech restrictions
remain integral to preserving market integrity, an institutional
approach to the First Amendment would favor greater speech regu-
lation in that particular setting.10 3
Despite the commonsense appeal of Schauer's and Siebecker's
institutional approach, it must ultimately be rejected as an inadequate
basis for a securities exception. Like the "extensive federal regula-
tion" rationale advanced in Wall Street Publishing, the institutional
approach appears to have already been forsaken by the Court. For
example, in Thompson, Justice O'Connor applied straightforward Cen-
tral Hudson analysis to strike FDA provisions with little or no concern
for the institutional role of the federal food, drug, and cosmetics
97 See Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L.
REv. 1256 (2005).
98 See Siebecker, supra note 95, at 650-51.
99 See id. at 649 (citing Schauer, supra note 97, at 1268).
100 See id. at 648 (citing Schauer, supra note 97, at 1274).
101 Id. at 649-50.




regime104-an "institution" that is as comparably well-entrenched in
American society as the federal securities regime.10 5 Significantly, the
dearth of institutional analysis injustice O'Connor's opinion does not
appear to be due to a lack of familiarity with the institutional
approach or related arguments. Justice Breyer, writing for the dissent
in Thompson, called for a "more lenient" application of the commer-
cial speech doctrine, reasoning that the Court's standard of review
should
reflect[] the need for distinctions among contexts, forms of regula-
tions, and forms of speech .... Otherwise, an overly rigid "commer-
cial speech" doctrine will transform what ought to be a legislative or
regulatory decision about the best way to protect the health and
safety of the American public into a constitutional decision prohib-
iting the legislature from enacting necessary protections.
10 6
Justice O'Connor and the other members of the majority, however,
evidently were not persuaded by Justice Breyer's call for a greater sen-
sitivity to the institutional context of commercial speech restrictions.
Instead, the majority opinion seemingly engaged in the same doctri-
naire "institutional agnosticism" critiqued by Schauer and
Siebecker. 107
The tension arising from the competing desires for a uniform
application of the commercial speech doctrine on the one hand, and
for greater consideration of unique institutional characteristics on the
other, is more explicitly manifested in the Supreme Court's attorney
advertising cases. This should not be surprising. The legal profession
is undoubtedly one of the most vital and well-established institutions
within the United States.10 8 The Court could not lightly ignore the
104 See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 366-77 (2002).
105 SeeJohn P. Swann, Food and Drug Administration, in A HISTORICAL GUIDE TO THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT 248, 253 (George Thomas Kurian et al. eds., 1998) (summarizing
the century-long history of the federal food, drug, and cosmetics regime and describ-
ing it as a "key ingredient in twentieth-century U.S. history").
106 See Thompson, 535 U.S. at 389 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
107 See id. at 367-68 (finding no reason "to break new ground" since "'Central
Hudson ... provides an adequate basis for decision'" (quoting Lorillard Tobacco Co.
v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554-55 (2001))); Schauer, supra note 97, at 1261-64;
Siebecker, supra note 95, at 646-47.
108 See ALExIs DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 258 (Harvey C. Mansfield
& Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. Chi. Press 2000) (1835) ("Lawyers in the
United States form a power that ... envelops society as a whole, penetrates into each
of the classes that compose it, works in secret, acts constantly on it without its know-
ing, and in the end models it to its desires."); Barry Sullivan & Ellen S. Podgor,
Respect, Responsibility, and the Virtue of Introspection: An Essay on Professionalism in the Law
School Environment, 15 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 117, 120 (2001) (noting
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significant institutional features of the legal profession when review-
ing First Amendment challenges to professional rules that restrict
speech. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,10 9 for instance, the Court first
ruled that attorney advertisements were protected commercial speech
by holding an Arizona disciplinary rule that prohibited attorneys from
advertising in newspapers or other media unconstitutional as
applied.110 Throughout his majority opinion, Justice Blackmun strug-
gled to balance the unique characteristics of the legal profession that
oppose extending First Amendment protections to attorney advertise-
ments against the doctrinal purity of a contextually blind commercial
speech doctrine."'
"the essential role that [the legal profession] has to play both in our democratic soci-
ety and in the greater world").
109 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
110 See id. at 384.
111 Compare id. at 383 (" [B]ecause the public lacks sophistication concerning legal
services, misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed unimportant in other
advertising may be found quite inappropriate in legal advertising."), and id. at 384
("[W]e recognize that many of the problems in defining the boundary between
deceptive and nondeceptive advertising remain to be resolved, and we expect that the
bar will have a special role to play in assuring that advertising by attorneys flows both
freely and cleanly."), with id. at 365 ("[That] Arizona's disciplinary rule is violative of
the First Amendment might be said to flow a fortiori from [ Virginia Pharmacy]. Like
the Virginia statutes [which prohibited pharmacists from advertising prescription
drugs], the disciplinary rule serves to inhibit the free flow of commercial information
and to keep the public in ignorance."), and id. at 372-73 (refuting the argument that
legal services are so different from fungible goods or services that advertisements for
legal services are inherently misleading), and id. at 376-77 ("Advertising is the tradi-
tional mechanism in a free-market economy for a supplier to inform a potential pur-
chaser of the availability and terms of exchange. The disciplinary rule at issue likely
has served to burden access to legal services, particularly for the not-quite-poor and
unknowledgable."). In the dissenting portion of his opinion in Bates, Justice Powell,
relying on concepts similar to Schauer's and Siebecker's institutional approach,
stressed the bar's historic dominion over attorney advertising and conduct. He stated:
The area into which the Court now ventures has, until today, largely
been left to self-regulation by the profession within the framework of canons
or standards of conduct prescribed by the respective States and enforced
where necessary by the courts. The problem of bringing clients and lawyers
together on a mutually fair basis, consistent with the public interest, is as old
as the profession itself...
In this context, the Court's imposition of hard and fast constitutional
rules as to price advertising is neither required by precedent nor likely to
serve the public interest.... The constitutionalizing-indeed the affirmative
encouraging-of competitive price advertising of specified legal services will
substantially inhibit the experimentation that has been underway and also
will limit the control heretofore exercised over lawyers by the respective
States.
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The Court more or less maintained this precarious balance" 2
until Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counse 11 3 In Zauderer, the Court
all but declared its "institutional agnosticism" towards the bar and its
rules of professional conduct that restricted advertisements for attor-
ney services. Zauderer involved a challenge to public reprimands
issued by the Ohio Supreme Court pursuant to several disciplinary
rules limiting certain forms of attorney advertisements." 14 In holding
most of the provisions unconstitutional as applied, 1 5 Justice White's
majority opinion dismissed the notion that regulations on commercial
speech regarding legal services should be treated differently from
commercial speech restrictions generally.11 6 Nondeceptive attorney
advertisements implicate the same interests as other forms of advertis-
ing. 1 7 Therefore, Justice White concluded, the Court ought to apply
its commercial speech doctrine with equal vigor to disciplinary rules
that prohibit truthful, nonmisleading attorney advertisements." 8
Id. at 402-03 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
112 See, e.g., In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447 (1978).
113 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
114 See id. at 629-36.
115 See id. at 655-56.
116 See id. 646-47.
117 See id. at 646 ("The value of the information presented in appellant's advertis-
ing is no less than that contained in other forms of advertising-indeed, insofar as
appellant's advertising tended to acquaint persons with their legal rights who might
otherwise be shut off from effective access to the legal system, it was undoubtedly
more valuable than many other forms of advertising.").
118 See id. at 646-47; see also Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 477-78, 479-80
(1988) (relying on Zauderer to strike down a prohibition on targeted, direct mailing
solicitations by attorneys). But see id. at 491 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("In my judg-
ment, however, fairly severe constraints on attorney advertising can continue to play
an important role in preserving the legal profession as a genuine profession.
Whatever may be the exactly appropriate scope of these restrictions at a given time
and place, this Court's recent decisions reflect a myopic belief that 'consumers,' and
thus our Nation, will benefit from a constitutional theory that refuses to recognize
either the essence of professionalism or its fragile and necessary foundations. In one
way or another, time will uncover the folly of this approach. I can only hope that the
Court will recognize the danger before it is too late to effect a worthwhile cure."
(citations omitted)); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 677 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("The legal profession has in the past been distinguished and well
served by a code of ethics which imposes certain standards beyond those prevailing in
the marketplace and by a duty to place professional responsibility above pecuniary
gain. While some assert that we have left the era of professionalism in the practice of
law, substantial state interests underlie many of the provisions of the state codes of
ethics, and justify more stringent standards than apply to the public at large." (cita-
tion omitted)).
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Consequently, considering the Supreme Court's treatment of
speech restrictions in other "institutional settings," it would be surpris-
ing if the Court relied upon the institutional nature of the federal
securities regime as a reason for exempting securities regulations
from the Court's traditional commercial speech doctrine. This, of
course, does not take away from the institutional approach's norma-
tive punch, but it does suggest that the institutional approach alone
cannot realistically support a securities exception under the Court's
current commercial speech jurisprudence.
III. APPLYING THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE TO THE "GUN
JUMPING" PROVISIONS OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
Assuming speech-restrictive securities regulations were scruti-
nized under the Central Hudson test, the majority of such regulations
would be upheld. Most securities regulations compel disclosures
rather than suppress speech and thus would be treated favorably
under the Court's commercial speech jurisprudence. The flexibility
of the commercial speech doctrine itself also suggests that a pragmatic
court could avoid toppling the entire federal securities regime while
still remaining faithful to the Central Hudson test. However, the "gun
jumping" provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 seriously threaten
the core values animating the commercial speech doctrine by prevent-
ing the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading securities advertise-
ments. The indiscriminate and overextensive scope of the "gun
jumping" provisions indicates that they are not reasonably fitted to the
governmental interests and therefore are unconstitutional.
A. The Impact of the Commercial Speech Doctrine on the Federal
Securities Regime Generally
The analysis provided above demonstrates that strong theoretical
currents within the Court's commercial speech jurisprudence would
resist most attempts to categorically exempt securities regulations
from Central Hudson analysis. At least one recent lower court case has
recognized the import of the Court's more robust commercial speech
doctrine by rejecting the notion that securities regulations ought to be
scrutinized under some unique standard of review.' " 9 So, assuming
the Supreme Court itself extends First Amendment protections to
119 See, e.g., United States v. Wenger, 427 F.3d 840, 846-48 (10th Cir. 2005) (refus-
ing, in light of Supreme Court's more recent commercial speech cases, to follow Wall
Street Publishing when reviewing a First Amendment challenge to section 17(b) of the
Securities Act of 1933 and concluding instead that the provision ought to be "scruti-
nized as would any limitation on commercial speech").
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commercial speech prohibited by securities regulations, what results?
Will the entire federal securities regime collapse, as the Wall Street Pub-
lishing court feared? 120 Is chaos within the capital markets the inevita-
ble consequence of doctrinal purity?
There are at least two reasons to think that such foreboding
prophecies would not come to pass. First, the most common type of
securities regulations-mandatory disclosure requirements-would
probably survive scrutiny under the Court's current commercial
speech jurisprudence. Within the commercial speech context, the
Court has drawn an important distinction between restrictions sup-
pressing speech and restrictions compelling speech.' 2 ' Regulations
suppressing speech directly hinder the free flow of information to
consumers-the principal justification for protecting commercial
speech. 122 In contrast, regulations compelling speech increase the
amount of information in the marketplace and thus implicate less
severely the First Amendment interests animating the commercial
speech doctrine.' 2 3 At times, mandatory disclosures actually seem to
serve those interests, such as when "warning[s] or disclaimer[s] might
be appropriately required . . . in order to dissipate the possibility of
consumer confusion or deception. '' 124 As a result, the Court has
adopted a more deferential posture when reviewing regulations man-
dating the disclosure of accurate information. 125 Indeed, the Court
has repeatedly stated its preference for compelled speech as a less
restrictive alternative to prohibitions on commercial speech 12 6 and
120 See SEC v. Wall St. Publ'g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
121 See, e.g., Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650-51; In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 200-01 (1982);
see also Wenger, 427 F.3d at 849 ("Zauderer, therefore, eases the burden of meeting the
Central Hudson test. In assessing disclosure requirements, Zauderer presumes that the
government's interest in preventing consumer deception is substantial, and that
where a regulation requires disclosure only of factual and uncontroversial informa-
tion and is not unduly burdensome, it is narrowly tailored."). In the case of pro-
tected, noncommercial speech, the Court does not seem to draw a distinction between
speech compulsion and speech suppression. See Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487
U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988) ("There is certainly some difference between compelled
speech and compelled silence, but in the context of protected speech, the difference
is without constitutional significance, for the First Amendment guarantees 'freedom
of speech,' a term necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and what
not to say.").
122 See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
123 See id. at 650-51.
124 In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 201.
125 See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
126 See, e.g., id.; In re PLM.J., 455 U.S. at 203; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 565 (1980); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350,
375, 384 (1977).
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has even suggested that disclosure requirements ought to be subject
to a rational basis-like review, rather than the intermediate scrutiny
typically applied to commercial speech restrictions. 127
Thus, securities regulations that compel disclosure would likely
be upheld under the commercial speech doctrine. 128 Presumably, the
SEC would justify these regulations by relying on the state's interest in
ensuring that investors have "adequate information upon which to
base [their] investment decision [s] ."129 Disclosure requirements that
inject more accurate information regarding the health and activities
of the issuing or reporting companies into the marketplace directly
advance that interest. Moreover, because compelled disclosures tar-
get "material" information-that is, information in which "there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important"130-such regulations do not appear "too extensive" and in
fact seem closely related to the state interest of promoting well-
informed, knowledgeable investment decisions.
The second reason why subjecting securities regulations to com-
mercial speech analysis would not lead to the collapse of the federal
securities regime is grounded in the inherent flexibility of the Central
Hudson test.' 3 ' Although the analysis provided in Part II of this Note
indicates that the Court is reluctant to create new tests or carve out
exemptions for certain types of speech restrictions, it appears more
than willing to work within the roomy parameters of the Central Hud-
son test to reach pragmatic results. 132 In this sense, Siebecker's institu-
tional approach, understood as an "added layer of analysis,"1I 3 could
provide the Court with a normative basis to cast a less scrutinizing eye
on certain speech-restrictive securities regulations. It is difficult,
therefore, to imagine the Court zealously wielding the commercial
speech doctrine to shatter the federal securities regime simply
because it determines Central Hudson is the appropriate standard of
review for securities regulations that limit commercial speech.13 4
127 See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 ("W]e hold that an advertiser's rights are ade-
quately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the
State's interest in preventing deception of consumers.").
128 See Drury, supra note 84, at 785-86.
129 See THoMAs LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECUPITIEs REGULATION § 3.4[1], at 74
(rev. 5th ed. 2006).
130 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
131 See Page, supra note 54, at 826-27; Suzanna Sherry, Hard Cases Make Good
Judges, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 3, 6 (2004).
132 See Sherry, supra note 131, at 6.
133 See Siebecker, supra note 95, at 649.
134 See Page, supra note 54, at 826-27.
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B. Applying the Central Hudson Test to the "Gun Jumping" Provisions
of the Securities Act of 1933
Section 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933 broadly prohibits any
communication calculated to generate an interest in securities related
to an offering prior to the filing of a registration statement. This
indiscriminate prohibition suppresses even accurate and nonmislead-
ing securities advertisements. Because section 5(c)'s wide reach lacks
a reasonable fit with the government interests of preventing fraud and
promoting market efficiency, section 5(c) is probably too extensive,
and therefore, unconstitutional under the commercial speech
doctrine.
1. An Overview of Section 5(c) of the Securities Act and Related
"Gun Jumping" Provisions
While the majority of securities regulations would likely survive
First Amendment scrutiny, regulations that ban the dissemination of
truthful, nonmisleading information are susceptible to being struck
down under the commercial speech doctrine. 135 As discussed above,
the Court favors disclosure over suppression13 6 and is particularly sus-
picious of total or near-total prohibitions of accurate, nonmisleading
commercial speech since "they usually rest solely on the offensive
assumption that the public will respond 'irrationally' to the truth. 137
Moreover, this preference for disclosure over suppression and distrust
of paternalism animates the federal securities regime itself.138
Because near-total prohibitions on accurate, nonmisleading speech
strike near the heart of the commercial speech doctrine and federal
securities law, such prohibitions would probably not benefit from the
Central Hudson test's flexibility but, rather, would likely endure the full
force of the commercial speech doctrine.139
Perhaps the most vulnerable securities regulations are the "gun
jumping" provisions found in the Securities Act of 1933, which pro-
hibit various types of communications during the prefiling period.
Pursuant to section 5(c) of the Securities Act, persons may not engage
in any offers to purchase or sell securities prior to filing a registration
135 See Drury, supra note 84, at 780-81.
136 See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
137 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996).
138 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234 (1988) (rejecting the argument
that investors would be overwhelmed by certain disclosures, since "[d]isclosure, and
not paternalistic withholding of accurate information, is the policy chosen and
expressed by Congress").
139 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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statement with the SEC. 140 This prohibition has been interpreted to
take effect approximately thirty days prior to the filing of the registra-
tion statement 141 and to encompass communications that are "calcu-
lated to arouse investor interest in the securities to be offered."'142
Although section 5(c)'s broad scope does not capture "factual busi-
ness information" that is not directed toward investors14 3-such as a
business' routine product advertisement-it could reach communica-
tions that contain information related to the expected offering. 44
Such communications might be construed as cultivating a buying
interest in the security and, thus, could constitute a prohibited "gun
jumping" offer to buy or sell the security. 145
In an attempt to clarify the distinction between prohibited "gun
jumping" communications and "legitimate pre-filing publicity," the
SEC amended Rule 135.146 The amended rule provides a safe harbor
for certain prefiling notices regarding a proposed offering made by
the issuer.147 To qualify for the Rule 135 safe harbor, the prefiling
communication must contain a disclaimer and be limited to specified
categories of information.1 48 For instance, the safe harbor would
shield a company's press release regarding its forthcoming offering if
it only contained the company's name and the expected timeframe
for that offering. 149 Although Rule 135 permits the inclusion of the
offering's "basic terms" within the prefiling communication, 150 there
is authority arguing that "basic terms" does not include the price of
the shares unless the offering is a rights offering to existing sharehold-
140 See Securities Act of 1933 § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2000) ("It shall be unlaw-
ful for any person... to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any
prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed as
to such security, or while the registration statement is the subject of a refusal order or
stop order or (prior to the effective date of the registration statement) any public
proceeding or examination under section 77h of this title."). See generally HAZEN,
supra note 129, § 2.3[1], at 83-85 (describing prefiling period prohibitions).
141 See HAZEN, supra note 129, § 2.3[1], at 83.
142 Id. § 2.3[2], at 86. Note that this broad interpretation of section 5(c) would
likely frustrate any attempt to construe the statute as targeting conduct rather than
speech. As Professor Hazen notes, for the purposes of section 5(c), "[t] he concept of
offer is not limited to contract law doctrine." Id.
143 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.169 (2007).
144 See HAZEN, supra note 129, § 2.3[2], at 86-88.
145 See id.
146 See id. § 2.3[2], at 87.
147 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.135.
148 See id.
149 See id. § 230.135(a) (2).
150 See id.
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ers or an offering to employees of the issuer.15' Additionally, the
same press release would lose the protection of Rule 135 by merely
adding the name of the underwriter. 152 Indeed, Rule 135 does not
cover any communications made by the underwriter, "reflect[ing] a
view that any publicity initiated by an underwriter ... is likely to be
viewed as the type of sales effort that section 5(c) was designed to
prevent. '153 Even if a company's prefiling communications fall
outside the terms of Rule 135 and the other safe harbors, however,
they do not automatically constitute section 5(c) violations. Instead,
the communications and their surrounding circumstances would be
subjected to a factual analysis in order to determine whether the com-
pany engaged in an illegal selling effort. 154 As a practical matter, how-
ever, the failure to adhere to the requirements of Rule 135 will usually
be treated as a section 5(c) violation. 155
2. Applying the Central Hudson Test
The formative securities case, Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 1 56 pro-
vides an excellent test case to analyze the constitutionality of the "gun
jumping" rules under the commercial speech doctrine. In Loeb,
Rhoades, an underwriter issued a press release publicizing the upcom-
ing initial public offering of a real estate venture based in Florida. 15 7
The press release identified the nationwide investment banking group
handling the offering as well as the issuer's principal officers.' 58 Addi-
tionally, during an interview with reporters, an agent of the under-
writer disclosed that the securities would sell for around ten or eleven
dollars per share. 159 Following the press release and interview, several
investment firms and individual investors expressed an underwriter
151 See HAZEN, supra note 129, § 2.3[3], at 89-90.
152 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.135(a) (2).
153 See HAZEN, supra note 129, § 2.3[3], at 89.
154 See id. § 2.3[3], at 90.
155 See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569, 574 (2d Cir.
1970) ("A checklist of features that may be included in an announcement which does
not also constitute an offer to sell serves to guide the financial community and the
courts far better than any judicially formulated 'rule of reason' as to what is or is not
an offer. Rule 135 provides just such a checklist, and if the Rule is not construed as
setting forth an exclusive list, then much of its value as a guide is lost.").
156 38 S.E.C. 843 (1959).
157 See id. at 843-44.
158 See id. at 844-46.
159 See id. at 846.
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interest and intent to purchase the securities, respectively. 160 The
underwriter, however, rebuffed these "indications of interest."161
This press release would likely violate section 5(c) under the cur-
rent SEC rules even though the disclosures were accurate. Since the
press release referred to the upcoming offering, it could not be con-
strued as simply a routine advertisement about the issuer's products
or services.162 Moreover, it was issued by the underwriter and thus
beyond the scope of the Rule 135 safe harbor.163 Even assuming the
issuer itself had distributed the press release, the publicity would
remain unprotected by Rule 135, because it disclosed the name of the
underwriter, the officers of the issuer, and the anticipated price of the
offered securities. 64 Most importantly, the interest expressed by the
various firms and individual investors indicates that the press release
generated a buying interest and, therefore, constituted an illegal offer
to sell. 1 65
Under the Central Hudson test,1 66 a court must first determine, as
a threshold matter, whether the press release was untruthful or mis-
leading. 167 Although the press release was factually accurate, the SEC
would still likely argue that the press release was misleading. More
specifically, the government may argue that incomplete-albeit truth-
ful-disclosures may skew an investor's perception of an offering and
consequently might unduly influence investment decisions.' 68 This
160 See id. at 846-47.
161 Id.
162 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.169 (2007).
163 See id. § 230.135.
164 See id. § 230.135(a)(2).
165 See Loeb, Rhoades, 38 S.E.C. at 850-51; HAZEN, supra note 129, § 2.3[2], at 87.
166 This Note will assume that the press release constituted commercial speech.
The rules for determining whether speech is "commercial" in character are vague and
constitute a highly disputed area of law. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner,
Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REv. 627, 638-48 (1990) (criticizing the
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech for having "no justifica-
tion in the real world"). However, this concern does not seem too problematic with
respect to the press release at issue, since it was distributed simply to arouse investor
interest in the offering and thereby help facilitate future securities transactions. This
is paradigmatic commercial speech. SeeVoLoH, supra note 33, at 196 (pointing out
that commercial speech is "[g]enerally speech that proposes a commercial transaction, i.e.,
commercial advertising" (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66
(1983))).
167 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
168 See Loeb, Rhoades, 38 S.E.C. at 852-53 ("[T]he danger to investors from public-
ity amounting to a selling effort may be greater in cases where an issue has 'news
value' since it may be easier to whip up a 'speculative frenzy' concerning the offering
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would be a difficult argument to mount, however. Given other protec-
tive measures in the federal securities regime, it is difficult to imagine
that the press release would deceptively induce investors into impru-
dent securities transactions. Before any transaction could be consum-
mated, the issuer's statutory prospectus would have provided the
market-and the individual investor-with all the prescribed material
information regarding the offering, 169 including any material infor-
mation already announced in the press release. Furthermore, Rule
15c2-8(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires the broker
or dealer for an offering involving a nonreporting company 170 to
"deliver a copy of the preliminary prospectus to any person who is
expected to receive a confirmation of sale at least 48 hours prior to
the sending of such confirmation." 171 This rule effectively mandates a
forty-eight hour "cooling off' period, which allows the investor to read
(or reread) the statutory prospectus and reconsider the offer before
any commitment to purchase the securities becomes binding. 172
Thus, the requisite information-and, importantly, the market's
adjustment to that information 17 3-would be at the investor's disposal
prior to entering any agreement to purchase the shares. To be sure,
there still exists some potential for deception. An investor may irra-
tionally ignore the additional disclosures contained in the statutory
prospectus and make an investment decision based solely on the infor-
mation contained in the press release. This mere potential for decep-
tion, however, cannot alone justify a complete suppression of factually
accurate prefiling communications like the press release. 174 Accord-
by incomplete or misleading publicity and thus facilitate the distribution of an
unsound security at inflated prices.").
169 See Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)-(b) (2000). Besides
the statutory prospectus, the issuer or underwriter could also disseminate a significant
amount of supplemental information regarding the offering in the form of "free writ-
ing prospectuses" prior to any sale of securities. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.433; see alsOJOHN
C. COFFEE, JR. ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 117-18, 120-21 (10th ed. 2007)
(describing how SEC rules governing free writing prospectuses permit the distribu-
tion of a wide array of communications during the "waiting period").
170 This would predominantly include issuers making an initial public offering,
such as the real estate venture in Loeb, Rhoades. See COFFEE ET AL., supra note 169, at
122.
171 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-8(b).
172 See COFFEE ET AL., supra note 169, at 122.
173 See Drury, supra note 84, at 776 (describing how amateur investors are pro-
tected by the market, which uses its "collective data, experience, and insight ... [to]
set the market price").
174 See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982). Whereas inherently "misleading
speech may be prohibited entirely," potentially misleading speech may not be categori-
cally suppressed unless the "character of such statements creates a state interest suffi-
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ingly, the court would likely conclude that the press release is not
unprotected, false or misleading speech.
After having determined that the press release is protected com-
mercial speech, the court would next inquire whether the proffered
governmental interests justifying section 5(c) and the related regula-
tions are substantial.1 75 The SEC would likely assert two governmental
interests: the prevention of fraud orchestrated by manipulative com-
munications advertising securities offerings and the advancement of
market efficiency by ensuring that investors have sufficient informa-
tion to make informed investment decisions. 176 The SEC would argue
that "gun jumping" undermines these interests by prompting inves-
tors to make investment decisions prior to full disclosure.
While the court would likely conclude that promoting market
efficiency and preventing fraud are substantial governmental inter-
ests, it would have reason to doubt whether the "gun jumping" restric-
tions are well-tailored toward those ends. No doubt the SEC could
marshal enough "evidentiary support" demonstrating that the restric-
tions directly advance the prevention of fraud by preventing prefiling
advertisements for securities. The silence imposed by section 5(c)
obviously makes it more difficult for issuers and underwriters to
deceive investors. However, it is debatable whether that silence pro-
motes market efficiency. Certainly markets operate more efficiently
the less tainted they are by false or misleading information. On the
other hand, if the free flow of accurate, nonmisleading information is
the sine qua non of efficient markets, 177 it seems counterintuitive to
contend that the suppression of truthful advertisements, such as the
press release, advances market efficiency.
ciently substantial to justify a categorical ban on their use." Peel v. Attorney
Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 100 (1990). Although ambiguous,
the Court seems to be suggesting that potentially misleading speech can be sup-
pressed only if the restriction is appropriately tailored-i.e., satisfies the three remain-
ing prongs of the Central Hudson test. See id. at 106-07.
175 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
176 See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 8 (1933); see alsoCOFFEE ET AL., supra note 169, at 88
("The Securities Act of 1933 has two basic objectives: (1) to provide investors with
material financial and other information concerning new issues of securities offered
for sale to the public; and (2) to prohibit fraudulent sales of securities."). Related to
these interests are consumer confidence and the stability of the capital markets. See
HAZEN, supra note 129, § 2.2[1], at 75 ("Another justification .. .is that the market
participants' knowledge that full disclosure has been made instills investor confidence
and hence stability which would otherwise be lacking ....").




However, even assuming that the "gun jumping" provisions
directly advance both governmental interests, they would still likely
fail the tailoring analysis due to their overextensiveness. By prohibit-
ing any communication calculated to generate a buying interest in a
security during the prefiling period, the provisions are "too extensive"
as a means for preventing fraud.178 Section 5(c)'s indiscriminate sup-
pression of both truly fraudulent speech and benign advertisements,
like the press release, indicates the SEC "did not 'carefully calculat[e]
the costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed'
by the regulations."'179 The SEC would likely counter that section
5(c)'s prophylactic nature is necessary because it is too difficult to dif-
ferentiate fraudulent or misleading advertisements from harmless
commercial speech. More specifically, the SEC might argue that
securities advertisements are particularly ripe for fraud or manipula-
tion since securities are intangible and derive their value from infor-
mation rather than some inherent worth.' 80 This potential for fraud
is exacerbated by the issuing company's control over the information
which shapes the market price of the securities.' 81 The SEC might
contend that these features warrant a prophylactic rule against securi-
ties advertisements during the prefiling period. This argument is
undermined, however, by the press release at issue: most if not all its
statements would be easy to verify. Moreover, it is not clear that secur-
ities advertisements are so qualitatively different from other commer-
cial advertisements that the SEC should be excused from the
conventional regulatory burden of "distinguishing the truthful from
the false, the helpful from the misleading, and the harmless from the
harmful." 182 Contracts for legal services share some of the same fea-
tures as securities transactions that seemingly justify a prophylactic
rule: the difficulty in verifying or quantifying the value of a particular
attorney's services; and the significant imbalance between the client's
and the attorney's understanding of the legal matters underlying the
services to be provided.183 Yet despite these characteristics, the Court
found that legal advertisements were not intrinsically distinct from
advertisements for other goods or services and, consequently, refused
178 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
179 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561 (2001) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 (1993)).
180 See Arthur R. Pinto, The Nature of the Capital Markets Allows a Greater Role for the
Government, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 77, 82-83 (1989).
181 See id. at 83.
182 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985).
183 See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 489-90 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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to relieve state bar associations of the burden of discriminating
between deceptive and nondeceptive legal advertisements. 18 4 Simi-
larly, the SEC should not be able to rely on section 5(c) "simply
to spare itself the trouble of distinguishing"'' 85 fraudulent securities
advertisements from truthful, nonmisleading securities advertise-
ments.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stated a clear preference
for disclaimers or warnings, instead of suppression, as a method of
addressing the harms attendant to potentially misleading speech. 186
Rather than enforcing a blanket ban on prefiling advertisements, the
SEC could require certain disclaimers to put investors on notice. 18 7
These disclosures would further the federal securities regime's ani-
mating purpose 88 and, in conjunction with antifraud provisions,
advance the interest of preventing fraudulent or misleading advertise-
ments for securities. 189 Of course, even with these additional mea-
sures, completely accurate prefiling advertisements might still lead
some investors to make poor investment decisions. This paternalistic
concern, however, should not enable the SEC to "chok[e] off access
to information that may be useful to [other] citizens."1 90
The "gun jumping" provisions also seem too extensive with
respect to the governmental interest in market efficiency. The near-
total prohibition on prefiling advertisements likely results in the sup-
pression of a significant amount of completely accurate information,
which would serve to increase market efficiency.' 91 The SEC would
probably argue that section 5 (c) acts primarily to prevent false or mis-
leading speech-which causes market inefficiencies-from reaching
consumers. Its incidental impact on truthful advertising, the SEC
might claim, is an unfortunate but necessary consequence of achiev-
ing that end and, on balance, results in a more efficient market than
184 See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 646.
185 See id.
186 See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
187 Although Rule 135 already requires a disclaimer, see 17 C.F.R. § 230.135(a)(1)
(2007), more warnings could be added. For instance, the SEC could mandate that
prefiling communications include a legend advising investors to read the statutory
prospectus before making any investment decisions. Cf id. § 230.433(c) (2) (i) (pro-
viding a model legend for free writing prospectuses, which cautions investors to "read
the prospectus in [the] registration statement and other documents the issuer has
filed with the SEC for more complete information about the issuer and this
offering").
188 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234 (1988).
189 See Drury, supra note 84, at 782.
190 See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 645 n.12.
191 See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 234.
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one in which both accurate and untruthful advertisements were per-
mitted to enter. Given the discussion provided above, however, it is
doubtful that the reviewing court would find this argument persua-
sive. Less restrictive disclaimers or warnings, in combination with
antifraud measures, would serve to prevent the dissemination of false
advertisements and help thwart investors from acting on such adver-
tisements. 192 Furthermore, protective features unique to the securi-
ties market counsel against a hypersensitive concern over false
information impairing market efficiency. Because the securities mar-
ket acts as a "single market clearinghouse" that constantly processes
and filters information in order "to determine if [a security is] of suffi-
cient interest or quality," even ill-informed investors are "able to free
ride on the research, expertise, and insights of the many market par-
ticipants when making a purchase."'193 Consequently, a reviewing
court would probably look skeptically upon any argument that the
extreme reach of section 5(c) is reasonably fitted to the end of market
efficiency.
CONCLUSION
When Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933, it consciously
rejected the merit-based approach then followed by state blue sky
laws.1 94 Under the merit approach, state agencies regulated the sub-
stantive fairness of securities transactions by prohibiting deals which
the "local . . . administrator deemed excessively risky, or unfair, or
overly generous to the promoters."' 9 5 The merit approach effectively
substituted the investor's judgments with the government's out of fear
that the investor would be unable to discern her own best interest.
The Securities Act, in contrast, does not investigate the substantive
fairness of a transaction but rather requires issuers to disclose all rele-
vant information regarding the offered securities. 196 Significantly, the
success of the Securities Act turns on the assumption that investors are
capable of evaluating the merits of an investment opportunity if ade-
quate information regarding the securities is available.' 9 7
In this sense, the basic presumption of the federal securities
regime converges with the core values underlying the commercial
speech doctrine. Since the Court initially recognized First Amend-
192 See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
193 See Drury, supra note 84, at 776.
194 See HAzEN, supra note 129, § 1.2[3] [A], at 22.
195 See COFFEE ET AL., supra note 169, at 62.
196 See HAZEN, supra note 129, § 1.2[3] [A], at 22.
197 See id.
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ment protections for commercial advertising in Virginia Pharmacy, it
has repeatedly declared its faith in commercial speech's power to dis-
seminate valuable information and in consumers' capacity to react
rationally to that information. Like the Securities Act, widespread dis-
semination of information rather than paternalistic meddling is the
modus operandi of the commercial speech doctrine.
That shared principle strongly suggests that speech-restrictive
securities regulations should not be exempted from First Amendment
scrutiny but instead ought to be examined under the Central Hudson
test. While most securities regulations would probably survive Central
Hudson scrutiny, the "gun jumping" provisions of the Securities Act
would likely be struck down. By imposing an indiscriminate ban on
securities advertisements during the prefiling period, section 5(c)
chokes off valuable channels of communications and withholds even
truthful, nonmisleading information from investors. This unnecessa-
rily severe impact upon the free flow of information is antithetical
both to the commercial speech doctrine and to the spirit of the Secur-
ities Act.
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